Internet auctions in marketing: The consumer perspective by Möllenberg, Antje
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Möllenberg, Antje
Working Paper
Internet auctions in marketing: The
consumer perspective
Arbeitspapier // Technische Universität Braunschweig, Institut für Marketing, No. 03/02
Provided in cooperation with:
Technische Universität Braunschweig
Suggested citation: Möllenberg, Antje (2003) : Internet auctions in marketing: The consumer
perspective, Arbeitspapier // Technische Universität Braunschweig, Institut für Marketing, No.
03/02, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54775Antje Möllenberg 
Internet auctions in marketing: 
the consumer perspective 
AP-Nr. 03/02 
Technical University ofBraunschweig 
College of  Business Administration 
Department of  Marketing 
ISBN 3-933628-48-2 Contents:  Page: 
Abstract ............................................................................................. 1 
1  Introduction ................................................................................. 2 
2  A consumer-oriented framework of  internet auctions ................... 2 
2.1  Defininition of  internet auctions .......................................... 2 
2.2  Business models .................................................................. 4 
2.3  Shopping at an auction site .................................................. 6 
3  Previous research on auction customers ..................................... 10 
3.1  Auction theory .................................................................. 10 
3.2  Consumer research............................................................ 11 
3.3  Internet user research ........................................................ 13 
3.4  Conclusion from theories .................................................. 15 
4  Empirical study of auction customers......................................... 15 
4.1  Method .............................................................................. 15 
4.2  Results .............................................................................. 16 
4.2.1  User types ............................................................... 16 
4.2.2  Auction usage ......................................................... 17 
4.2.3  Bidding behavior .................................................... 20 
4.2.4  Future marketing potential ...................................... 22 
5  Discussion ................................................................................. 26 
References ....................................................................................... 28 
Author  .............................................................................................. 30 1 
Abstract 
Internet auctions for consumers are among the lnost popular and lnost 
successful business models in electronic COlnmerce.  Research so  far, 
however, has focused on prerequisites and consequences of auctions 
as a marketing instrument of suppliers. Even though it is a key success 
factor from a lnarketing perspective, the delnand side has not inspired 
sünilar attention. 
This paper focuses on the attitudes, lnotives, and behavior of auction 
custolners. It shows why current beliefs about bidder characteristics 
are lnyths. Taking these lnisconceptions as  a starting point, the exist-
ence of an experiential and a praglnatic type of auction customer is 
proposed. An explorative empirical study looking for the character-
istics of  both types of auction customers is described. 
Results indicate that less than half of auction shoppers in the study are 
experiential oriented. Except substantial additional demand concern-
ing technological and emotional qualities of auctions these shoppers 
do  not differ dramatically from pragmatic oriented shoppers.  Both 
types  are  open-lninded towards  further  development  of consumer 
auctions to commercial marketplaces. Business models of auctioneers 
and suppliers should concentrate on the basic utility of the auction 
algorithlTI by facilitating individual matchmaking instead of pursuing 
costly  additional  utility by promoting the  entertainment value  of 
auctions. 2 
1  Introduction 
Internet auctions for consumers are one of the web'  s biggest success 
stories. Even after the initial euphoria about the "new economy" has 
been replaced by more realistic appraisals of e-commerce, the auction 
industry is regarded as  a paragon of the net-based economy (Porter 
2001,  p.  67).  Eliciting  consumers'  enthusiasm from  the  very be-
ginning, a variety of most singular goods have been auctioned on the 
web, such as a vacation at Bahnoral Castle, pop diva Madonna's bra, 
or debris of the Berlin Wall. The fact that auctions are increasingly 
used as a platform for everyday goods such as CDs, cOlnputers, books, 
and clothes is somewhat overshadowed by such unique, if spectacular 
auctions. 
Consulner encounter internet auctions  either as  auctions from  con-
sumer to consumer (C2C) or as auctions from business (auctioneers or 
suppliers) to consumers (B2C).  The "2C"  in both suggests the term 
"consumer auction".  Early C2C  auctions  were  often dismissed by 
economists  as  "flea markets"  (Schrage 2000, p.  92).  B2C auctions 
have sparked considerably more interest in researchers and marketers. 
Still, this attention has focused on the supply side and neglected the 
customer. From a marketing perspective this is a serious omission, as 
consumer orientation or indeed any business Inodel must be based on 
valid information about the customer. The intense and widespread in-
volvement of consumers in internet auctions justifies a closer look at 
their motivation, attitudes, and behavior. From this analysis insights 
about the preconditions and consequences of  using auctions in market-
ing may be gained. 
2  A  consumer  ... oriented framework of internet auct  .. 
ions 
2.1  Defininition of internet auctions 
In business administration, auctions are defined as market institutions 
that take place as  sporadic, real-life events, requiring the physical 3 
presence ofparticipants and goods. These characteristics obviously do 
not apply to auctions in the virtual market space. Interestingly, in Ger-
many legal definitions of auctions do not exist. Moreover, legislation 
such as it is, is applicable to traditional auctions only. As they do not 
fit into the legal scheme, internet auctions have caused severe prob-
lems, many but not all of which have been amended by recent EU 
guidelines on e-commerce. A persistent, big obstacle as far as market-
ing is concerned is the lack of confidence in legal aspects of auctions 
in the minds ofboth custoluers and suppliers. 
The definition of auction  theory is  more appropriate.  Auctions are 
viewed as institutionalized methods for price formation, in which the 
allocation of  resources is determined by an explicit algorithm based on 
the bids of market participants (McAfee/McMiIlan 1987, p.  701). The 
active, dominant role of  the demand side is crucial to the auction proc-
ess (Cassady 1967, p.  8). Internet auctions are best described as a vir-
tual market institution relying on internet services (especially WWW 
and e-mail) to implement central (dynamic, bidder-driven price for-
mation  and allocation)  as  weIl  as  peripheral  (catalog  or bidder's 
register) auction features. 
Internet auctions are modeled closely after traditional auctions. The 
internet helps to overcome temporal and spacial restrictions of tradit-
ional auctions and brings about a grave reduction in trans  action costs. 
Generally, auctions are indicated in situations of market failure, e.g. 
when there is incomplete competition or uncertainty about prices. This 
may be the case when unique goods are offered, when the variability 
of  prices is high, or when large amounts of  goods have to be distribut-
ed very quickly. However, while classic auctions are restricted either 
to  expensive,  luxurious  goods  such as  antiques  or art,  or to  large 
amounts of identical merchandise such as produce, on the "virtual auc-
tion floor"  the auction mechanism can be applied to  every kind of 
product or user.  Thus, with auctions the  internet has  enabled C2C 
electronic commerce on a wide scale (Lührig/Dholakia 2002, p. 120). 
One consequence of the heterogenity of auction definitions  is  the 
ambiguity of the term "auction" on different semantic levels. On the 
macroscopic level, an auction is an organized market event that con-4 
sists of multiple single auction sales. In this sense that recalls the defi-
nition of business administration, auctions are comparable to a shop 
offering a variety of goods. On the microscopic level, an auction is a 
specific instantiation of the  auction algorithm and its  parameters, 
leading to a single auction sale. This interpretation corresponds to the 
view of game theory on actions.  And finally,  internet auctioneers 
sometimes also are referred to as "auctions". Thus, "internet auction" 
may refer to a certain auction sale (e.g. a single eBay auction for a 
vintage teddy bear), an organized auction event, where several items 
are being auctioned (e.g.  all offers on the eBay platform at a given 
point oftime), or an internet auctioneer (e.g. the eBay company). This 
plethora of  meanings may cause serious misunderstandings. 
2.2  Business models 
Internet auctioneers adopt one of  two different business models, which 
entail opposing marketing concepts (table 1). 
Store auctions (Elliott 2000, p. 2f.) realize the B2C consumer auction 
model by offering new merchandise and branded goods. To this end 
they cooperate with brand manufacturers and logistic services. Often 
they act as  retailers by purchasing, stocking, and delivering goods. 
Short-termed auctions of  just a few minutes duration, often conducted 
in real time, and presented by a human moderator mimic the glamor-
ous atmosphere of real auctions. This so-called auctainment is meant 
to  attract entertainment-seeking consumers. A parallel is  the brand 
strategy: in saturated markets, consumer products and services are fre-
quently augmented by additional emotional utility in order to disting-
uish a brand from its competitors. Two rationales underlie this ap-
proach (1) attracting customers by auctioning well-known brands, and 
(2)  attempting to stand out in the saturated e-commerce market with 
its low entry barriers for competitors and many similar shopping and 
auction sites just "one click away" . 
The earliest example of the  auctainment approach was US  auction 
pioneer Onsale,  founded  in May  1995  (Lucking-Reiley  2000,  p. 
228f.). The model was adopted by many German pioneers. Examples 
are Ricardo (founded late  1998),  12snap (a pioneer of mobile auc-5 
tions) and Primus auctions (an e-commerce branch of  Metro Holding, 
the largest trading company in Germany). After an initial period of 
growth and enthusiasm however, nearly every B2C auction went out 
ofbusiness or re-Iaunched their sites as C2C auctions. 
Open  auctions implement a C2C consumer auction Inodel, although 
many of  their representatives such as eBay currently are incorporating 
B2C activities as  weIl.  Open auctions list used goods,  employ long 
term auctions between 3 and 14 days, and dispense with human auc-
tioneers. Their users are assumed to be motivated by "bargains" rather 
than by experiential aspects of auctions. The most popular example is 
eBay (founded September 1995). The company entered the German 
market as a follower by taking over its German imitator Alando. de in 
June 1999, when Alando had been on the market for just three months. 
Although competition is  strong, C2C auctions thrive and aim for the 
B2C market. 
Models differ greatly in the way they target auction custolners. The 
auctainment model as represented by early Ricardo attempts to  gen-
erate exciting and entertaining auction events, while the matchmaking 
model as represented by early eBay facilitates finding and closing the 
best possible auction deal.  In doing so, the auctainment model em-
phasizes the auction process, making the consumers' involvement in 
the bidding an important success factor.  The matchmaking model on 
the other hand focuses on the outcome of  the auction. 
Obviously the auctainment model primarily targets a specific market 
segment, the thrill-seeking auctainers. The appeal of novelty and var-
iety as an end in itself as well as enjoyment ofthe bidding competition 
are characteristics of this type of auction participant. The type of user 
that is  addressed by the matchmaking model is  much less obvious. 
negotiating a deal at a personal price. Thus, it may safely be assumed 
that the prevailing user type here is price, or rather value oriented. 
Although the assumptions underlying both auction models offer some 
face validity, neither has been studied empirically. Very few studies of 
auction users actually exist. Most of what is assumed to be true about 6 
auction users results from the portrayal of auctions and their users in 
popular media and the professional field and is no more than a myth 
(Herschlag/Zwick 2000). From SOlne  characteristics of auctions such 
as the risk they entail, the enticing price mechanism, the glamorous 
atmosphere  of real  auctions,  and their unsuitability for  everyday 
shopping, it is  concluded that auction users must be risk-seeking, 
thrifty, and easy to snare by unique and even overpriced offers, if only 
they are presented in a stimulating atmosphere. This implicit person-
ality theory (Cronbach 1955; Pervin 1978) yields a good starting point 
for empirical research on auction users but should not be the founda-
tion on which to build a whole industry. Customizing auction market-
ing for auctainers or for bargainers may both fail: Auctainers are hard 
to please, because bew attractions must be offered continuously or the 
auction experience will cease to be entertaining; bargainers constitute 
only about 8 % of active internet users (McKinsey 2000), which may 
not suffice to sustain a business model in the long run. 
Transaction area  C2C  B2C 
Business model  Open Auction  Store Auction 
Example 
eBay,  Onsale, Ricardo, 
Yahoo, hood  Primus, Atrada, 12snap 
Differentiation by 
Used goods 
New consumer goods, 
product range  brand products 
Differentiation by  Long term auctions 
Short term, real time, 
auction form  and event auctions 
Differentiation by 
Best bargain  Auction experience  customer utilitv 
Market 
Matchmaking  Auctainment  positioning 
Target market  Bargainers  Auctainers 
Table 1: Business models of  internet auctioneers 
2.3  Shopping at an auction site 
Auctions involve three players with distinctive roles, motives, bene-
fits, and risks (figure 1). The auctioneer evokes bids from the auction 
floor, repeats them aloud to bidders and knocks the item down to the 7 
highest bidder. In internet auctions, these role is usuaHy taken by the 
auction software; only the auctainment model featured human auction-
eers. Because of the seller's passivity in traditional auctions, the roles 
of seHer and auctioneer often are not delnarcated (see 3.1). In internet 
auctions the seHer is more active.  The bidder plays the most promi-
nent role in auctions, as  auctions are determined by bidder activity 









Figure 1: The tripolar structure of  internet auctions 
The auction process consists of three successive phases: before, dur-
ing, and after the sale (figure 2). Most discussions of internet auctions 
focus  on the price determination process. However, each phase re-
quires active participation and implies its own marketing chaHenges. 
Exaggerated emphasis on the bidding process oversimplifies auctions 
and fosters misconceptions about auction users by concentrating on 
the most variable and exciting aspects of  internet auctions. 
e  In the pre-sales phase, bidders locate and evaluate attractive offers. 
SeHers  design  and promote  sales  offers  by selecting  adequate 
values for the auction parameters (starting price and duration), and 
by providing the buyer with information (pieture and verbal de-
scription of the item). The pre-auction phase ends with the bidder's 
decision to bid. Auctioneers support this stage by providing auction 
tools and counseling bidder and seHer. 8 
"  The safes phase starts with the auction phase. Bidders take a very 
active part, continuously watching the  auction and reappraising 
their valuation as  others place bids, and alternative offers turn up. 
SeIlers must content themselves with a passive role as they cannot 
influence the auction once the item goes online in the auction sys-
tem.
I  Bidding is terminated according to  an acceptance rule. Long 
term auctions usually end after a pre-defined length of time; short 
term auctions end when no bidding activity has been registered for 
some time. Auctioneers support this phase by intelligent software 
tools called bidding assistants. The second part of the sales phase 
consists of  payment and delivery. Auctions can get extremely tedi-
ous at this stage, especially if many auctions must be managed at 
the same time. Many tools provided by auctioneers facilitate trad-
ing in this transaction phase, e.g. escrow or payment services. 
"  After the auction the activity shifts to  seIler and auctioneer. The 
seIler prepares future  sales.  He  is  also  answerable to  guarantee 
claims.  Auctioneers support this phase by custoluer-relationship 
and cross-selling tools. Auctions are naturally biased towards single 
transactions, so  it is important though difficult to  establish long-
term relations between customer and seller as well as customer and 
auctioneer. 
Substitutes for auctions from the shoppers ' view may be any shopping 
form that offers comparable advantages to customers. Although no 
alternative has all distinctive characteristics of internet auctions, many 
substitutes  can be identified both online  and  offline.  In the  C2C 
domain there are  classified ads  and flea  markets  (Bearchell  1999; 
Porter 2001, p.  67) as  weIl as  P2P online exchanges for deals with 
other consumers. In the B2C domain discounters and factory outlets 
offer attractive deals, mail order businesses and online shops conduct 
business from a virtual distance, and unique items at a bargain price 
can be fbund at real auctions or specialized retailers. But only internet 
auctions combine all of  these qualities into one on a regular basis. 
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Figure 2: Transaction phases in internet auctions 
The price mechanism also serves as a criterion for finding alternatives. 
In the offline world consumers normaHy encounter fixed-price B2C 
commerce. Counter examples are rare; only the oriental bazaar often 
serves as a metaphor for internet auctions (e.g. Lührig/Dholakia 2002, 
p.  113). For SOlne  expensive consumer goods (e.g.  cars) , individual 
negotiation of contract details also is common. Recently, German law 
has permitted individual bargaining in any consumer directed sale, 
having regulated price negotiations very tightly before;  however, 
haggling at the baker's or in the shopping center is inconvenient and 
impracticable for both market sides and because of such trans action 
costs does not happen in reality. C2C shopping such as classified ads 
or flea markets do not impose such restrictions and thus offer adjusted 
prices as  weH,  though at much higher trans action costs than internet 
auctions.  In the online world,  computer-implemented pricing algo-
rithms enable other forms of consumer oriented price determination, 
e.g. co-shopping, name-your-price price-seeking, bilateral negotiation, 
or exchanges. Again, internet auctions are unique from the consumers' 
viewpoint, as they are the only price building mechanism to incorpor-
ate competitive pricing on the demand side and leave the supplier with 
a take-it-or-Ieave-it option. 10 
3  Previous research on auction customers 
Three fields of research apply to the study of consumer behavior at 
internet auctions, classic auction theory, consumer research, and inter-
net user studies. These theories are now examined for evidence supp-
orting the existence of  two separate types of  auction shoppers. 
3.1  Auction theory 
In his seminal paper, Vickrey (1961) laid down the cornerstones of 
auction theory, which were to  dominate the field  in the  following 
years. He outlined two basic auction models and compared them in 
terms of effectiveness and outcome for the seHer.  Since that time, 
auction theory has had a normative, supply-side emphasis (without 
distinguishing between the seHer and the auctioneer), giving implica-
tions as to how auctions should be designed in order to maxünize the 
seHer's profit. The heyday of auction theory was in the 1980s, center-
ing around the major contributions by Milgrom/Weber (1982)  and 
McAfee/McMillan (1987), both with the traditional seHer focus.  Dur-
ing forty years of auction theorj, the buyer's point of view has been 
addressed in a single paper (Matthews 1987), and even that at closer 
scrutiny turns out to be written from the seHer' s perspective. 
In auction theory bidders are conceptualized as  highly rational indi-
viduals. They are assumed to reselnble each other closely regarding 
valuations, resources, and behavior. Bidder homogeneity is modeled 
by drawing the valuations on which bids are based from a common 
distribution without revealing them to the other bidders . 
.,  In the simplest auction model valuations are independent of others' 
estimates and are determined by individual preferences. Situations 
in which this independent private values model applies are auctions 
für coHectibles, for rare or unique items or any good that is intend-
ed for personal use only, so that the price can only depend on sub-
jective utility. 
•  If on the other hand estimates are correlated because the bidders 
assume a common value to the good being auctioned, the common 11 
values model applies. This is the case for resaleable goods, or any 
consumer good with a listed price or store price that is  COlnmon 
knowledge. Bids may still differ because this COlnmon value often 
is unknown and has to be estimated. Table 2 provides an overview 
of  both basic models. 
Model  Independent private values  Common values 
Valuation basis  individual. subjective utility.  collective. objective value. 
ex ante known  ex ante unknown 
Interdependence of 
independent preferences 
estimates of objective value 
valuations  i  nte rcorre lated 
Source of risk  preference uncertainty  quality uncertainty 
Bids signalling  other bidders' preferences  unknown true value 
Applicability 
rare or unique items  consumer good with listed price 
personal use  items for resale 
Example  e.g. collectibles  e.g. licences. consumer goods 
Table 2: Basic models of  auction theory 
Preferences are exogenous to the model, as are individual differences 
in behavior, resources or attitudes. Any diversion in these factors be-
fore, during, or after the auction cannot be captured by auction theory. 
Also, while classical auctions were being held for homogenous groups 
ofbuyers (e.g. flower sellers, antiques or stamp collectors) who often 
were chosen and invitated by the auctioneer, the users of internet auc-
tions are extremely heterogenous due to virtually unrestricted access. 
So, looking at auction theory does not really help. Still, auction theory 
suggests two basic types of  auctions (although this distinction is based 
on the type of goods) and allows for the inference of two types of 
users. 
3.2  Consumer research 
Two  areas of consumer behavior research seem related to  auction 
buyer  behavior:  purehase  decisions  (Kotler/  Armstrong  1994,  p. 
162ff.) and purehase motives driving a consumer' s choice. 12 
There are four kinds of purchase decisions which usually go with a 
special type of good (Kotler/  Annstrong 1994, p.  162ff., p. 278): 
GI  Extensive purehase decisions occur when the good to be purchased 
is expensive, and the decision is unique. As all alternatives are new 
and must be considered, deciding takes a lot of cognitive effort. 
Every shopper new to internet auctions or looking for luxurious or 
very rare offers (specialty goods) is forced to extensive decisions. 
GI  Limited  purehase decisions can fall back on a reduced set of  evoked 
alternatives because of previous shopping experience or a preselec-
ti  on of brands. The effort of deciding also is  smaller. The type of 
good associated with this type of decision making is  called shop-
ping goods. As will be shown below, most purchase decisions in in-
ternet auctions can be expected to be of  this type. 
GI  Impulsive purehase decisions  are  triggered by a stimulus in the 
shopping situation, leading to a spontaneous, uncontrollable urge to 
buy.  The  goods  most appropriate to  these  decisions  are  called 
impulse goods. Some internet auctions try to induce this kind of 
decision making by live  auction events  and human moderation 
(auctainment model; see 2.2). 
GI  Habitual purehase decisions require very little effort. They result 
from repeated occurences of any other type of purchase decision 
which  cause  complex  cognitive processes  to  be  compiled into 
simpler behavioral routines  that  are  executed automatically  on 
presence of the stimulus. Goods which widely correspond to habit-
ual behavior are called convenience goods. 
Auctions provide buyers with several ways to look for offers, foster-
ing at least two ways of decision making: Browsing the auction site 
promotes impulsive bidding, whereas search machines constitute a 
more rational approach to  finding an interesting auction.  However, 
because each and every auction anew has to be evaluated in terms of 
supplier, quality, price level and so on, the auction purchase decision 
must always remain a complex decision.  This undermines both im-
pulsive behavior as well as the habitualization process. Internet con-
sumer auctions could therefore never really be convenient. This is 
especially true if the buyer participates in many auctions  simulta-
neously. Increasing auction experience, acquaintance with the auction 13 
platform and previous shopping experience will render limited pur-
chase decisions most probable. 
German research on purehase motives has suggested five basic mo-
tives: price orientation, experiential orientiation, convenience orienta-
tion, brand orientation, and service orientation. 
Online shoppers are assulned to be motivated mainly by price, con-
venience, and brands. Although the original positioning of suppliers as 
bargain dealers has probably played an important part in generating 
the price pressure predominant in e-commerce today, innovative pric-
ing mechanisms such as  auctions do cover an existing need of online 
customers. Brand orientation may serve as a means to further differen-
tiate between a me re bargainer who is interested in the cheapest buy, 
and the so-called smart shop  per, who actively seeks out brands at the 
lowest price possible (Esser 1999). 
Experiential orientation refers to shopping for motives other than ob-
taining the product, e.g. diversion from daily routine, self satisfaction, 
physical activity,  communication, peer group  attraction,  status,  or 
pleasure of bargaining (Li/Kuo/Russell 1999). The term recreational 
orientation  (Tauber  1972)  captures  such  shopping  motives  more 
closely. It has often been argued that the internet is unable to fulfill 
experiential demands, concluding that online shoppers should score 
lower on items measuring recreational or experiential orientation (e.g. 
Loevenich 2002). Empirical evidence on this topic is not straightfor-
ward. In an early US study, no differences between frequent online-
shoppers and non-online shoppers conceming recreational orientation 
were observed (Li/Kuo/Russell 1999). A more recent German study 
found significantly higher recreational as well as price orientation in 
online shoppers as  compared to non-shoppers (Loevenich 2002). In-
ternet auctions as  a comparably emotional type of onIine shopping 
may at least partially explain this result. 
3.3  Internet user research 
Specific studies ab out auction customers are rare. Elliott (2000, p. 39) 
differs two types of auction customers:  collectors  and  bargainers. 14 
Without further  explanation,  German researchers  have  added the 
"serious  shopper" to  these  types  (Weinhardt/Schmidt 2001),  thus 
implying that the first two types are not to be taken seriously. 
From panel data the German market research company GjK has deriv-
ed six types of "e-commercers" (i.e. people doing online shopping) 
(Spohrer/Bronold 2000). Most prominent were the so-called profes-
sionals and practitioners who react strongly to new offers and are in-
terested in attractive and easy-to-use commercial sites. Because of the 
potential entertainment value of internet auctions, gameboys/cyber-
girls as  young and brand oriented e-commercers also belong to  the 
target market. 
From MediaMetrix' s  US  panel, McKinsey has  also  arrived at  six 
shopper types.  Most important  e-commercers  are  utility-oriented 
simplijiers and price oriented bargainers. More than 50 % of visits at 
eBay.com are  attributed to  bargainers  looking for  good value and 
special offers (McKinsey 2000). 
Both typologies identify one type that is curious and open-minded but 
has been busy more with browsing than with shopping and thus is no 
e-commercer (Clicker/GfK..; Surfer/McKinsey). 
There are some similarities between these typologies: Each identifies 
some types that primarily seek emotional experiences, and atllers that 
are rational and goal oriented. This resembles the distinction made by 
HoffmanINovak (1996) who suggested two behavioral categories of 
internet usage: 
•  Goal oriented user behavior is  characterized by extrinsic moti-
vation, highly structured selective search, and high involvement. 
Users are result oriented, i.e. they want to find a solution to a prob-
lem or get done with a task. In auctions such behavior occurs when 
seeking offers by specified criteria and on definite demand. 
•  Experiential user behavior is characterized by intrinsic motivation, 
unstructured, associative and hedonistic behavior. Users are process 
oriented, i.e.  carry out the behavior for its own sake. In auctions 
this kind of behavior is found as  browsing the site without acute 15 
demand or as  spontanous bidding near the end of an auction. Auc-
tainment is trying to induce and exploit process orientation. 
3.4  Conclusion from theories 
On examination of implicit user theories, economic theories of auc-
tions and behavioral theories two types of auction shoppers repeatedly 
eluerge. This paper therefore proposes the existence of two shopper 
types. Based on the corresponding marketing concept the experiential 
oriented custoluer is called auctainer. Analogous to the smart shopper 
the result oriented customer will be called smart bidder. Each type is 
attributed certain preferences, characteristics, and behaviors (table 3). 
Attribute  Auctainer  Smart Bidder 
Motive  experiential/recreational  price orientation, 
orientation  praamatic orientation 
Information seeking  browsing; emotional stimuli  seeking; cognitive stimuli 
Intention  process  result 
Purchase decision  impulse purchase  limited purchase 
Risk attitude  risk seeking  risk averse 
Shopping  unexperienced, new customer  experienced, repeated buyer  experience 
User type  experiential/recreational type  bargainer, practitioner 
Purpose  personal use, collecting  personal use, reselling 
Auction model for  independent private values  common values 
brand purchasinQ  (emotional differentiation)  (price orientation) 
Bidding behavior  aggressive bidding  bargain bidding 
Marketing concept  auctainment  matchmaking 
Table 3: Proposed types of  auction customers 
4  Empirical study of auction customers 
The following data is taken from a doctoral thesis on internet auction 
shoppers (Möllenberg 2003). 
4.1  Method 
The study used an explorative survey design. Shopper types were con-
structed post-hoc. The differences concerning auction usage, bidding 
behavior, and future marketing potential of auctions were then exam-
ined using univariate and multivariate statistical procedures. 16 
A combination of e-mail survey and web survey seemed appropriate 
as internet auctions require their participants to rely heavily on virtual 
communication methods anyway.  The study was conducted in the 
months of May and November as during these periods there are no 
major holidays and users are most likely to participate in auctions. 
In November 2000, 2,382 auctions at eBay.de were randoluly access-
ed.  Auctions were selected by calling an eBay interface routine re-
turning the list of 100 auctions about to end next. These were then 
called one by one (having ended in the meantime), and saved into a 
database. Auctions that were illegal, not consumer-oriented, or not 
lueant for the Genuan market were excluded from further analysis. 
In May 2001, every seIler and highest bidder from these auctions was 
contacted by e-mail and asked to participate in a web survey. All in 
all,  2,791  addresses were used (1,522 sellers,  1,228 buyers plus 41 
more addresses from a practice sampie). After invalid addresses and 
refusals to participate were excluded, 2,602 addresses (93.2 %) re-
mained in the sampie. 436 completed web questionnaires (16.8  %) 
were returned. 
4.2  Results 
4.2.1  User types 
Subjects classified themselves into  four basic user types based on 
verbal descriptions. They indicated both the best and the second best 
fitting  description.  Only about one quarter of participants viewed 
theluselves as the experiential type. Half said they were the pragmatic 
type, and one fifth considered themselves price oriented (figure 3). 17 
First choice (n = 422)  i1%  ..  :::·::A.~:~·~:::::: 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~------~~~~~~~~~ 
Second choice (n = 422)  ~~~22.8%:~~~ 
~~~~------~~~~~~~~~ 
"''''''''''  Experiential type (n = 113)  8.8% 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Practical type (n = 199) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Surfer (n =  31) 
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Bargainer (n =  79) 
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Figure 3: Self categorization into types 
Surfers were excluded from further analysis as they were very few and 
by definition did not shop at auctions or on the web anyway. The re-
maining subjects were regrouped by the following rule: All subjects 
featuring the experiential type as either first or second choice were re-
grouped as auctainers. All other subj ects featuring any combination of 
price or pragmatic orientation were regrouped as smart bidders. This 
process resulted in two comparably sized subsampies with 186 (auc-
tainers) and 205 (smart bidders) subjects. 
4.2.2  Auction usage 
Smart bidders have been using the  internet longer than auctainers 
(3.99 vs.  3.63 years; T = -1.616, P = .11). There is no difference in 
currentfrequency of internet access, but in access place: auctainers 
much more frequently use their ho me access whereas smart bidders 
access the net equally or more often from the work place (X
2 = 13.91, 
df =  2, P < .01).  The attitude towards risk was operationalized as  a 
fixed-price traditional retail buy (certainty equivalent) as opposed to a 
risky  auction alternative.  No  significant difference  of means  was 
found:  Both types tend to be slightly risk seeking. On closer inspec-
tion of the  distribution smart bidders turn out to  contain more es-
pecially risk averse buyers. 18 
The analysis of auction experience indicates large interindividual dif-
ferences within groups rendering means differences mainly insignifi-
cant. On the surface, smart bidders bid on (160 vs. 123; T = -0.616) as 
weIl as won (33.2 vs. 32.6; T = -0.093) more auctions than auctainers 
in the three months preceding the study. They also spent more money 
per auction (69.40 DEM vs.  57.00 DEM; T = -1.136). As regards the 
type of  goods bought, auctainers buy more unique goods and enter-
tainment articles, while smart bidders buy consumer goods. Both cus-
tomer groups cover a large proportion of their delnand (between 40 
and 75  % depending on product category) via auction. FinaIly, the 
purpose of  purehase indicates that auctainers tend to give away their 
auction purchases either by resale or as  a gift, while Slnart bidders 
keep and use them (X
2 = 5.58, df= 2, P < .05). 
Users were also asked to rate some reasons for and against taking part 
in internet auctions.  Hardly any differences were found.  In the ex-
ploratory factor analysis of  the reasons for auction participation three 
factors  were extracted:  attractive features of auctions, unattractive 
features of  other shopping forms, and excfusiveness of  auction safes 
offers. Auctainers agreed significantly more to the item "bidding is 
fun" (figure 4). no time to look 
somewhere else 





good quality offers 
large assortment 
bidding/winning 









•  '0 
- O·  Auctainer (n = 186)  -II1II- Smart Bidder (n =  205) 
* p:s; 0,05 
Figure 4: Reasons for using auctions 
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The exploratory factor analysis of reasons against auction participat-
ion yielded three factors capturing phase specific problems of auction 
transactions. Both types of buyers view the pre-sales phase as  most 
critical, e.g.  quality uncertainty or seHer reliability. Problems during 
the sales phase itself are rated second, while the after-sales phase is 
seen as fhe smallest cause of  difficulties (figure 5). uncertain about quality 
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Figure 5: Reasons against using auctions 
4.2.3  Bidding behavior 
agree 
completely 
Construction of customer types was guided by the idea of separating 
experiential oriented customers from all other types. To demonstrate 
the success of this attempt bidding behavior is analyzed. Many differ-
ences between auctainers and smart bidders can be seen (figure 6). Ex-21 
p1oratory factor analysis returns a five  dimensional structure of bid-
ding behavior. The differences can be traced back to two factors: Auc-
tainers  score higher on  the  factor  experiential strategy (0.176 vs. 
-0.116; T = 2.922, P < .01); smart bidders scorehigher onpragmatic 
strategy (-0.129 vs.  0.143;  T = -2.749, p < .01).  This result may be 
taken as va1idity proof of group construction. The other three strateg-
ies were named valuation by common value, valuation by independent 
value, and an especially conservative cautiousness strategy. 
bid more careful the less 
certain objective value 
bid more than intended 
if involvement high ** 
bidding is fun ** 
bid by objective value 
(e.g. store price) 
result more important 
than bidding process (*) 
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all value object like I do 
disagree 
completely 
• o·  Auctainer (n = 186)  -l1li- Smart Bidder (n = 205) 
(*) p < 0,10  * P < 0,05  ** P ~ 0,01 
Figure 6: Bidding behavior 
agree 
completely 22 
4.2.4  Future marketing potential 
The acceptance for new merchandise and for commercial sellers are 
important indicators  for  buyers'  affinity  to  cOlnmercial  consumer 
auctions (B2C). For both indicators means in the indifference range 
were measured; new merchandise was rated slightly lnore favorable 
(3.26 on ascale from  1 = rejection to  5 = preference), cOlnmercial 
seHers  were rated slightly less favorable  (2.72).  A look at the  fre-
quency distribution shows that more smart bidders prefer used mer-
chandise and private seHers, although differences are not statisticaHy 
significant. 
When asked what features would increase auction adoption, notable 
differences between user groups were found (figure 7).  Auctainers 
showed a lnarked preference for  live auctions, fixed-price  formats, 
and power shopping. In an exploratory factor analysis this bundle of 
variables was identified as a separate dimension (innovative sales for-
mats) with significantly higher factor scores of  auctainers as compared 
to smart bidders (0.202 vs. -0.147; T = 3.390, P < .001). 
To auctainers offline information and access are more important than 
to smart bidders. In combination with the items "mobile information" 
and "mobile access" these items also load on a distinct factor (alter-
native access). Auctainer score much higher on this factor than Slnart 
bidders (0.040 vs.  -0.164; T =  2.030, P < .05).  Other dimensions of 
adoption factors were identified as fulfilment support,  additional in-
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Figure 7: Auction adoption factors 
very 
important 
To look for perceived alternatives to  auctions, subjects were put in a 
fictitious  forced choice situation (where to  shop if there no  longer 
were such a thing as internet auctions). Auctainers then te nd to prefer 
any fonn of e-commerce more than smart bidders (figure 8).  Power 
shopping is the worst alternative to both groups. The best alternative 
for  the auctainers is  online  shopping,  for  smart bidders brick-and-24 
Inortar retailers. Traditionallnail order rates medium high with both 
groups. 
This item operationalizes only prefered substitution of auctions by 
other shopping forms.  The reverse interpretation, substitution of the 
alternative shopping fonn by auctions and thus the threat to traditional 
distribution channels is not a valid inference. However, the ratings 
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Figure 8: Alternatives to auctions 
most approproate 
alternative 
Today SOlle goods are not typically sold via auctions. In the analysis 
of purchasing readiness towards these goods it turned out that both 
user types can best imagine the purchase of  shopping goods (figure 9). 
The least potential is  attributed to  fresh groceries that indeed seem 
rather unsuitable for auction. An exploratory factor analysis addition-
ally returned the dimensions standardizable goods and goods  for 
everyday use. On this final factor auctainers score significantly higher, 25 
i.e.  they would tend more to buy everyday consumer goods in auct-
ions. The item services that loaded high both on the factors shopping 
goods as well as  on goods for everyday use luay be interpreted that 
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Figure 9: Future auction goods 
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Finally the attitude towards the imminent development 0/  private into 
commercial consumer auctions was addressed. Both user types judged 
this expansion controversially, but Inainly favourably (figure 10). As-
sortment and choice are expected to improve; brand products are seen 
as enriching. Smart bidders do not expect the quality of auctions to be 
diminished, while auctainers are much less sure of that. Exploratory 
factor analysis showed that all in all auctainers tend to perceive more 
chances as  weH  as more risks than smart bidder, although on both 
factors their factor values do not differ significantly. Brand products enrichment 
will use auctions more 
danger to auction 
more choice 
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Figure 10: Attitude towards commercial auctions 
5  Discussion 
agree 
completely 
Previous research was not concerned about internet auction customers. 
Generally auction shoppers are thought to be thrill-seeking bargain 
hunters. Several theories and empirical results indicate the existence 
of two different types of auction customers, an experiential type and a 
pragmatic type. The empirical study reported here examined behavior-
al differences between such types. Results offer several implications 
for research and for the marketing of internet auctioneers and sup-
pliers. 
Foremost research task is the replication and comprehensive validat-
ion of shopper types derived in this study. A more thorough integra-
tion of auction buying behavior with theories and models of consumer 
behavior or the smart shopper phenomenon looks promising. 27 
Internet auctioneers should note that experiential shoppers are a mi-
nority. In many traits auctainers and smart bidders do not differ much; 
auctainers are simply experiential oriented as  well. Business models 
exploiting this  additional utility (auctainment) while neglecting the 
core utility of the auction algorithm (individual matchmaking) are Ull-
able to retain customers in the long run. Because of the peculiar qual-
ity of novelty of losing its flavor automatically, this is true even if  the 
absence of the basic utility remains undetected; it is the more true if 
shoppers notice manipulative intentions. The auctainment model thus 
seems substantially flawed and the existence of a durable competitive 
advantage doubtful. The failure of  this approach in the real world must 
not be confused with the failure of  B2C auctions on the whole. Ebay'  s 
success in penetrating the market niche left by the auctainment model 
demonstrates that this  is  not true.  Future  success  of auctions will 
depend on developing bidder tools that further facilitate transaction 
managetnent. 
Commercial suppliers who want to put consumer goods and services 
up for auction can count on the fact that auctions are a well establish-
ed,  popular, and generally accepted form of online shopping. High 
purchase frequency and large percentage of demand covering via auc-
tions make the auction customers studied here a very attractive target 
market of e-commerce, one that is highly committed to auctions and 
perceives verj few difficulties. Auctainers are somewhat more open-
minded than smart bidders but they are probably not the better cust-
omers: They report more unintentionally high bids and less content-
ment after the purchase. The lack of return options in most auctions 
may explain their tendency not to keep auction goods. Moreover, auc-
tainers must be offered an additional "auction experience", causing 
surplus costs to the seller. The biggest obstacle to auction adoption by 
sellers probably is the lack of control over progress and final price of 
auctions.  Judging by their customers,  initial chances  of consumer 
auctions as a marketing tool can be rated excellent. 28 
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